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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000202-CA
F I L E D
(September 26, 2002)

Richard F. Norris,
2002 UT App 305
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robiil W. Reese
Attorneys:

Sharon L. Preston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Orme.
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
%1
Richard Norris appeals his sentence entered pursuant to
conditional pleas of guilty to two counts of communications
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(1) (1995) .
BACKGROUND
^2
Norris advertised employment positions, promising salaries
and benefits for "diet counselors." Norris required the
prospective "employees" to sign what they believed to be
agreements regarding the custody of the diet product. Those
agreements were in fact sales agreements wherein the "employees"
turned out to be purchasers of the product, rather than employees
entrusted with distributing the product. When the "employees"
refused to pay, Norris then sued on those contracts. He was
eventually charged with thirteen counts of communications fraud.
1)3
Norris1 s trial counsel assured him that the trial date would
be continued. However, on the date set for trial, the trial
court denied Norris's motion to continue. Norris's counsel then

urged him to plead guilty to two of the charges, rather than face
conviction for all thirteen charges, pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement offered by the prosecution before trial. Norris
followed his attorney's advice, and pleaded guilty pursuant to
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing entry
of guilty plea conditioned upon Defendant's preservation of right
to appeal trial court's denial of suppression motion). He
conditioned his pleas upon assurances by the court and the
prosecution that certain issues would be preserved for appeal.
The court specifically enumerated the issues that Norris would
have the right to appeal once his guilty pleas were accepted and
entered.1 That enumerated list included his claim of vindictive
prosecution.2 The record indicates that'Norris raised this issue
several times through the course of the proceedings. Although
the court had not ruled on Norris's vindictive prosecution claim,
it promised him that he had a right to appeal it. In fact, the
court stated "I would like to make a list of those motions that
1. The court itemized the following issues as preserved for
appeal:
(1) the court's denial of Norris's motion to dismiss
based on the statute of limitations; (2) the court's denial of
Norris's motion to dismiss based on the expungement of the arrest
records made in conjunction with the charges; (3) the court's
denial of Norris's motion to remove his counsel for incompetency
and conflict of interest; (4) the effective denial of Norris's
speedy trial rights; (5) Norris's vindictive prosecution claim;
(6) the State's failure to comply with discovery requests; (7)
the constitutionality of Utah's communications fraud statute; and
(8) inadequacy of the information.
2. After the court enumerated the appealable issues, Norris
struggled to identify more issues he hoped to preserve. The
court apparently satisfied Norris's trepidation by promising
Norris that "you're reserving the right to appeal any issue that
the Court has heard and ruled on, but ruled adversely to you
. . . you'd have a right to appeal that issue." The parties
agreed in oral arguments that this was the most sweeping Serv
plea they had seen. Although the breadth of the court's promises
is not an issue before us, we note our concern that blanket
preservation of issues for appeal may very well overflow the
banks of what is allowable under Sery and its progeny. See State
v. Serv, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Sery, we adopted
the practice of accepting conditional guilty pleas because
"forcing the parties to go through an entire trial merely to
preserve the suppression issue is a pointless and wasteful
exercise." Sery, 758 P.2d at 93 9. Thus, conditional pleas serve
the purpose of promoting judicial economy. The broad conditional
pleas involved here, however, do not serve the ends of judicial
economy.
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Dear Ms. Stagg:
The State, through counsel, writes pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to offer the following law (attached) which is determinative of the
constitutional challenge addressed by the parties in Point I of the opening and responsive
briefs in this matter. The attached decision, issued by a panel of this Court on August 12,
2004, was rendered in another appeal involving the same defendant who appears in the
instant case. Defendant made the same constitutional challenge to the communications
fraud statute in both appeals. In the decision, this Court concludes "that the
communications fraud statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad, nor
unconstitutionally vague." 2004 UT App 267, f 16,
Utah Adv. Rep.
.
Accordingly, the challenge presented by defendant in Point I of the instant appeal has
been conclusively decided against him.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call counsel at 366-0180.
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Kris C. Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
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Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable James R. Taylor
Attorneys: Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
DAVIS, Judge:
11 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three
counts of communications fraud, Richard Norris (Defendant) challenges
the constitutionality of the underlying statute (the communications
fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003).-^We affirm.
BACKGROUND
52 Defendant was charged with seven counts of communications fraud
and was bound over on all counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801
(2003). After several days of trial, Defendant entered an
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of third-degreefelony communications fraud. See id. § 76-10-1801(1)(c). After
sentencing, and without moving to withdraw his guilty pleas,
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
13 We consider two issues on appeal. First, we must determine whether
this court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant's
constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an unconditional,
voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for
correctness . . . ." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,18, 31
P.3d 1147. Second, if this court has jurisdiction, then we must
consider whether the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face. "Constitutional
challenges to statutes present questions of law, which we review for
correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,55, 86 P.3d
735. "When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the
statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,56, 980 P.2d 191.

ANALYSIS
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
54 "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that
by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional

violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see
also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,113, 54 P.3d 645. The State
asserts that Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of
the communications fraud statute falls within the ambit of the "preplea constitutional violations" mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at
1278. Therefore, the State argues that because Defendant's challenge
is nonjurisdictional in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea.
Defendant asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id.,
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda admonitions and
search warrants, and that a facial constitutional challenge to a
statute is, at its heart, a jurisdictional issue. Therefore,
Defendant argues that his challenge was not waived by his guilty
plea.
55 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the
court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot
proceed." Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (per curiam). Subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged at any
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is
never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (quotations and citations omitted). When subject matter
jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is the duty of this court to 'satisfy
itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review.'" EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423,
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244
(1934) ) ,-^16 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, but does not bar appeal of claims that the applicable
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an
offense." United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.l (9th
Cir. 1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all non[]jurisdictional
defects and fact issues, a vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional
defect. Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could raise on
appeal that he was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute."
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quotations and citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S.
61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty
to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the
charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.");
Blackledqe v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding that guilty
plea did not preclude the defendant from raising his constitutional
claims because they "went to the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him");
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (addressing
defendant's claim that the underlying statute was unconstitutional
because it "properly f[e]ll within the narrow scope of review not

barred by a guilty plea11)/ cert, denied, 538 U.S. 1065 (2003); United
States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional is a
jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty plea); United States v.
McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's
argument on appeal after his guilty plea because he made "the only
argument available to him by asserting a jurisdictional challenge
based on the constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United
States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n.l (7th Cir. 1996) ("[The
defendant] entered his guilty plea without preserving his
constitutional challenge[ to the underlying statute] for appeal.
However, the government has expressly declined to raise a waiver
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir.
1995) (challenge to constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty
plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's challenge
to the constitutionality of the underlying statute after recognizing
the principle that such a challenge "is a jurisdictional claim which
is not waived by the guilty plea"); United States v. PalaciosCasquete, 55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir. 1995) ("A guilty plea . . .
does not waive the right of an accused to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under which he is convicted.");
Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the defendant "did not waive his constitutional attack on the
[underlying] statute by pleading guilty"); United States v. Montilla,
870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although the dividing
line between constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty plea
and those that survive the plea is not "crystal-clear," "[c]laims
that 'the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the
indictment fails to state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not
waived by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262
n.l)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1423 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of
guilty . . . does not bar a claim that the defendant may not
constitutionally be convicted in the first instance . . . . If [the
defendant] ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he is
not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes
'to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to
answer the charge brought against him.'" (quoting Blackledqe, 417
U.S. at 30)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 1179, 1180 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (recognizing that "a guilty plea does not bar an
appeal that asserts that . . . the charge is unconstitutional");
United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1295 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977)
(recognizing that a claim based upon "the unconstitutionality of the
statute underlying the indictment" was an "appealable issue[]
following a . . . guilty plea"); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 978 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing "that after entering . . .
a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal jurisdictional defects
in the proceeding below, such as . . . the unconstitutionality of the
statute underlying the indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d

666, 672 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea waives
only nonjurisdictional defects and does not waive the right to
contest the constitutionality of the statute that is the basis for a
conviction." (second alteration in original) (quotations and citation
omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing that "[a] defendant who has pleaded guilty is not barred
from claiming . . . that the statute under which he was charged is
unconstitutional" (quotations and citation omitted)); 1A Charles Alan
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed. 1999)
("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not apply to
constitutional claims that go fto the very power of the State to
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against
him.T A defendant who has pleaded guilty may still contend . . . that
the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional." (quoting
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30) (footnotes omitted)).
57 Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
directly cuts to "the power and authority of the court to determine a
controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is necessarily a
jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea does
not operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a
statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in nature.-^Therefore, we address Defendant's arguments .-^II. Constitutional Challenge
1Q Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801 (2003). We consider each of his arguments in turn.
A. Overbreadth
59 "In considering whether a statute [is overbroad], a court's first
task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT
110,515, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations omitted). We examine
"criminal statutes . . . with particular care; those that make
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct
may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate
application." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). However, " [o]
nly a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on
its face." City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987).
Overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial as well."
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quotations and citation
omitted).
110 When interpreting the challenged language, "we look to the
statute's plain language and presume that the legislature used each
term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at 116. "Statutory

language is overbroad if its language proscribes both harmful and
innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The
communications fraud statute prohibits devis[ing] any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money,
property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,
and . . . communicat[ing] directly or indirectly with any person by
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits that the
communications fraud statute is overbroad "because it permits
criminal prosecution and sanctions in every case involving a
communication[] that could be construed as dishonest." Specifically,
Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute does not
require an intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes innocuous
behavior because "[a]s long as there is an artifice, a false
communication in any form made for the purpose of executing the
artifice, and a desire to obtain anything of value, the elements of
the communications fraud statute are met." Defendant also alleges
that the modes of communications prohibited in the communications
fraud statute are similarly overbroad and prohibit constitutionally
protected conduct. See id. § 76-10-1801(6). We disagree.
Ill First, the communications fraud statute does not prohibit all
false "pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,"
only those where an individual seeks "to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value." Id. § 76-10-1801
(1). Second, it requires proof that the false or fraudulent
"pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or
omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth." Id^_ § 76-10-1801(7). While the
First Amendment may value some falsehoods for their contribution to
public debate, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
n.19 (1964), it has not given protection to malicious statements that
were made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless
disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Id. at 279-80. The
communications fraud statute draws the distinction between criminal
and innocent behavior with a similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be
said that it is "substantially overbroad" and should be "invalidated
on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458. Accordingly, we conclude that
the communications fraud statute is not overbroad on its face.
B. Vagueness
512 Defendant argues that the communications fraud statute is
unconstitutionally vague in its use of the terms "artifice,"
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801
(1), (6)(a). "The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute

or ordinance define an offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations
omitted). However, because the communications fraud statute
"implicates no constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."
Village of Hoffmann Estates v. Flipside, Hoffmann Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982).
fl3 Defendant argues that the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801(1), is defined too broadly and would encompass any form of
deceit so that ordinary persons would not know whether the deceit was
prohibited. While not defined in the communications fraud statute,
"artifice" is commonly understood to mean "an artful stratagem," or a
"trick." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed. 1986).
Black 1 s Law Dictionary defines "artifice" similarly as "[a] clever
plan or idea, especially] one intended to deceive." Black1 s Law
Dictionary 108 (7th ed. 1999) . Additionally, we do not read the term
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a vacuum, but rather
as it relates to the other terms within the communications fraud
statute. See Dowlinq v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,58, 502 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(stating that "[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in
a vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a
whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the communications fraud statute
does not prohibit all artful stratagems and tricks, only those meant
to, inter alia, defraud others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague because it is broad." State v. Wareham, 772
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations
omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the term "artifice," as used in
the communications fraud statute, is not unconstitutionally vague.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1).
SI14 Defendant next argues that the term "communicate," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the broadest
possible definition" under the communications fraud statute. The
communications fraud statute prohibits "communicat[ing] directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme or artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1).
Additionally, it specifically states that to communicate "means to
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of
information; to talk over; or to transmit information." Id. § 76-101801(6)(a). Defendant's argument is unavailing. Although
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6) (a) , is broadly defined,

this does not necessarily make the term unconstitutionally vague. See
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966. Indeed, the communications fraud statute
does not seek to punish those who keep an artifice or scheme to
themselves. Defendant fails to demonstrate how "ordinary people can
[not] understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails to
demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in the
communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1801(6) (a).
515 Finally, Defendant argues that the phrase "anything of value,"
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because
it is undefined and left open to a variety of interpretations.
Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical situations in an attempt to
illustrate the vagueness of the phrase "anything of value." Id.
However, "speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical
situations not before the [c]ourt will not support a facial attack on
a statute when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its
intended applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000)
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was charged under the
communications fraud statute because he devised a scheme to defraud
others of "money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We believe that
"the vast majority of [the communications fraud statute's] intended
applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733 (quotations and citations
omitted), will involve incidents where individuals have defrauded
others of "money" or "property," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), both
of which are terms that are sufficiently understood to allow ordinary
citizens to determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935 P.2d
at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant was charged with devising a
scheme to defraud others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1),
his actions do not fall within the "anything of value" realm, id.,
and thus, he may not challenge this phrase as unconstitutionally
vague. See Village of Hoffmann Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 ("One to
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully
challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted) ) .-^516 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the communications fraud
statute fails. We conclude that the communications fraud statute is
neither unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
517 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we conclude that Defendant's
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute is not barred by his voluntary, unconditional guilty plea.
However, in considering Defendant's facial challenge to the
communications fraud statute on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we
conclude that it is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.

Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's conviction.

James Z. Davis, Judge

ORME, Judge (concurring) :
518 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately to explain my
position, because I recognize the lead opinion represents a departure
from the general prohibition against raising issues for the first
time on appeal, especially in the face of a guilty plea.
519 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject matter jurisdiction
is an issue that may be raised by either party or the court at any
time. So far as I am aware, there is no exception to this rule for
guilty pleas. See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) ("[Subject matter jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can
neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection
to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged
at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & citation
omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
220 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to sovereign immunity
cases is actually pretty good. If a plaintiff sued the State without
giving the required presuit notice, and the State did not raise the
lack of notice as a defense below, it would presumably not be
permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first time on appeal in
challenging a judgment that had been entered against it. However, if
giving the presuit notice is necessary to vest the court with subject
matter jurisdiction, then of course the lack of notice could be
raised for the first time on appeal. And indeed, giving presuit
notice strictly in compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has
been held to be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,516, 37 P.3d 1156.
521 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction issue usually
arises in civil cases, the concept is the same in criminal cases. If
a guilty plea is entered, and no issues are reserved for appeal
consistent with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), then unless the guilty plea is set aside as involuntary, all
issues are waived on appeal, except subject matter jurisdiction,
which can never be waived. See James, 965 P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32year-old defendant was charged with murder in juvenile court and pled
guilty, on appeal to this court he most certainly could challenge the

lack of the juvenile court!s subject matter jurisdiction over an
adult charged with murder, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105
(Supp. 2003)--even if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he
never raised the jurisdictional problem below. The same is true if a
defendant pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no such
criminal offense were on the books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and
did not raise below the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he
still could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the first
time on appeal, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. And
obviously he would succeed. The trial court simply would lack the
judicial power to convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime.
122 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: Suppose our
criminal code made it a felony to commit the crime of blasphemy,
defined as "disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning His
existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not
preserve a constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and did
not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he raise for the
first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality, under the First
Amendment, of the statute criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it
seems that charges brought pursuant to such a statute would be just
as much a nullity as charges brought, as in the immediately preceding
hypothetical, in the complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In
simplest terms, in this country there simply could be no crime of
blasphemy--any statute purporting to provide otherwise would be
facially unconstitutional. But he could not raise this constitutional
challenge for the first time on appeal unless facial
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction.-^- Does it? I
am not completely sure, although [ can see that, in concept, an
unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no statute.
123 This is what ultimately explains my vote in this case: No Utah
appellate court has squarely answered the question of whether a
challenge to a criminal statute based on facial unconstitutionality
goes to subject matter jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a
multitude of cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's opinion
cites no case that has addressed the question and held it does not.-^It is admittedly somewhat counterintuitive for me that a substantive
conclusion of unconstitutionality--even facial unconstitutionality—
defeats subject matter jurisdiction, but that seems to be the
prevailing view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur in the
court's opinion.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result):
124 I do not necessarily disagree with the main opinion's analysis of
the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003) . But, because of the procedural posture
of this case, I would rule that we cannot reach the issue under
controlling Utah law.-^525 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant entered an
unconditional guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud.
Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (allowing
defendants to enter conditional pleas preserving the right to appeal
any specified pretrial ruling). In the district court, Defendant
never challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Nor did he
enter a conditional plea to preserve his right to appeal the
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. See id.
Furthermore, Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. S^e State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,53, 40 P.3d 630 (requiring
defendant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea within thirty
days after the entry of the plea before defendant can challenge the
validity of the guilty plea on appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a
notice of appeal directly from his sentence. Now, for the first time,
Defendant attempts to raise the issues of overbreadth and vagueness
as constitutional challenges to the communications fraud statute. He
claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him
of violating an unconstitutional statute.
126 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding of jurisdiction.
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained subject matter jurisdiction
very succinctly as follows: "A court has subject matter jurisdiction
if the case is one of the type of cases the court has been empowered
to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court
derives its authority." Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,516, 498 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4 (other quotations and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter
jurisdiction is ?the authority and competency of the court to decide
the case. 1 " (citations omitted)).

527 The main opinion contends that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute is necessarily a jurisdictional matter
because the inherent constitutionality of a statute affects whether a
court has the power and authority to decide the issue. However,
without a proper challenge, courts must presume the constitutionality
of a statute.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is

clearly shown. It is only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some
constitutional provision that they can be declared void. Every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt
resolved in favor of constitutionality.
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,510,
P.3d
(quotations and citations omitted). Thus, because the communications
fraud statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to be
constitutional, and the district court had jurisdiction.
128 In footnote two of the main opinion, my colleagues attempt to
find support for their extraordinary decision by pointing to the
distinction between general jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not focus "on
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in [this] particular
context" because, unlike claims made against governmental entities-which require compliance with the Immunity Act—the communications
fraud statute at issue here requires that nothing be done, by either
party, before criminal defendants can be prosecuted and courts can
exercise subject matter jurisdiction. With claims against a
governmental entity, "the legislature has explicitly declared how,
what, when, and to whom a party must direct and deliver a Notice in
order to preserve his or her right to maintain an action against a
governmental entity." Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,115,
37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[c]ompliance with the Immunity Act is necessary
to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear
claims against governmental entities." Id. at 516. In the instant
case, as with presumably every other criminal prosecution, the
charging statute does not explicitly declare what must be done before
subject matter jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the district court
had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction due
to an absence of legislative requirements or limitations .-^-

129 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to challenge the constitutionality
of the communications fraud statute, he had to do so first in the
district court. See, e.g., State v. Puqmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) ("Although [defendant] raises the issue on appeal, he
did not challenge the constitutionality of this statutory scheme
before the trial court. As a general rule, we will not consider
issues — including constitutional issues — initially raised on
appeal."); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As
the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally
will not consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the
appellant raises on appeal for the first time.").
130 This rule applies with equal force to facial challenges to a
statute made for the first time on appeal. In State v. Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), when a facial challenge to a
criminal statute was raised for the first time on appeal, this court
addressed Archambeaufs challenge only for the "plain error" and
"exceptional circumstances" arguments he made. See Archambeau, 820
P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant, in the instant appeal, asserts no claim
of plain error or exceptional circumstances.
131 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional challenges for the
first time on appeal will logically necessitate overruling a large
body of jurisdictional jurisprudence involving Utahfs justice courts.
See, e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 517 (Utah
1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied
with a justice court decision could appeal that decision to a
district court and that the district court decision was final unless
the validity or constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on
appeal, but in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App
312,12, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) ("fThe decision of the district
court [from a hearing de novo following a justice court's ruling] is
final and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.'" (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App
405,16, 61 P.3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides that neither
this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from proceedings in the district court held pursuant to an
appeal from the justice court unless the issues raised in the justice
court involve[] the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or
statute." (quotations and citations omitted)); City of Kanab v.
Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[H]istorically,
Utah appellate courts have never had jurisdiction to hear appeals of
district court decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an
unfavorable justice court judgment, absent the raising of a
constitutional challenge in the justice court."). The practical
consequence of the main opinion is that defendants will now be
allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this
court, for the first time, without ever having bothered to raise the
issue in either justice or district court.
132 Having failed below to challenge the statute on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness, and having failed on appeal to argue
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of the
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm based on
Defendant's failure to preserve his constitutional challenge.

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

1. Because the communications fraud statute has not changed since
Defendant was charged, we cite to the most current version for
convenience.
2. Instead of focusing on whether subject matter jurisdiction exists
in a particular context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases generally
describing jurisdiction of our courts of general jurisdiction. The
issue squarely presented in this case has not been addressed by Utah
courts.
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to the concept that a
court with general jurisdiction over a particular claim may or may
not have subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. Although not
directly analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the best example
involves claims against governmental entities. There is no question
that courts of general jurisdiction in Utah have jurisdiction over
those claims. This notwithstanding, however, Utah appellate decisions
have repeatedly held that the failure to strictly comply with the
statutory requirements for claims against governmental entities
deprives those courts of subject matter jurisdiction over such
claims. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,2516-17,
37 P.3d 1156; Security Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,113, 47
P.3d 97.
3. The justice court appeal process analog in Judge Bench!s opinion
is somewhat puzzling.
Since justice courts are not courts of record, traditional appellate
review is generally unavailable or severely limited. This
notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution guarantees "the right to
appeal in all[ criminal] cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In City of
Monticello v, Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), our supreme
court ruled that the trial de novo appellate procedure now set out in
Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (2002) satisfied this
constitutional mandate. See Christensen, 788 P.2d at 518-19.
Following a trial de novo, traditional appeal therefrom is available
only if "the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7).
In our view, this unique process for obtaining review of justice
court proceedings has nothing to do with issue preservation or waiver
of nonjurisdictional constitutional claims by voluntary guilty p l e a —
section 78-5-120 makes no reference to either. Indeed, if anything,
it is a recognition of the importance of claims involving the
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, specifically
contemplating such challenges in the court of record in the first
appeal. Under the statutory scheme, raising the constitutional
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the method by which
jurisdiction is conferred on appellate courts to entertain further
appeals, the defendant having already been accorded his or her

constitutional right of appeal from the justice court by trial de
novo in a court of record. This is a far cry from the ability to
challenge subject matter jurisdiction in an initial appeal of right.
4. The State argues that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv.
Rep. 4, both addresses and disposes of the issues herein. The
appellant's claims in Myers were based upon the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, see id. at 510; and, to the extent the appellant
alluded to constitutional defects in a statute, his challenge was not
facial. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court characterized his
argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect legal interpretation [of
a rule of law]," and never addressed or ruled upon the effect of a
facial constitutional challenge. Id. at 117.
5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states that "[a]rguably, this is
precisely the type of conduct the communications fraud statute was
intended to prohibit."
6. Judge Bench points out such an argument could be reached under the
plain error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue opportunity provided by
the plain error doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter shown, the
ability to claim plain error can itself be waived. In contrast,
subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived. In the blasphemy
hypothetical, if facial unconstitutionality is a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed for the first time on
appeal even if plain error was not raised, see State v. All Real
Property, 2004 UT App 232,113 n.7; was inadequately raised, see State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of
the requirements for plain error are not met, "plain error is not
established" and cannot be raised); or was raised too late. See
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,19, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding court would
not reach unpreserved issues under plain error doctrine because plain
error raised for first time in reply brief).
7. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim that Myers v. State, 2004 UT
31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, considered this question and rejected it on
the merits. The Myers court described the jurisdictional argument
asserted in the case as being "somewhat convoluted." Id. at 115.
Later, the Court characterized the argument as being tantamount to a
"claim[] that the trial court's decision constituted an 'erroneous
application of the law. 1 " Id. at 117 (citation omitted). In any
event, the Court's dismissal of the jurisdictional argument in Myers
was premised on the simplistic notion that " f [a] court has subject
matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court
has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from
which the court derives its authority,'" id. at 116 (citation
omitted)—an obvious overstatement as readily shown by the sovereign
immunity example, i.e., district courts have general civil
jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over disputes against the State,
but lack subject matter jurisdiction over such a case if the presuit

notice is flawed in some way. Another example of the overbreadth of
the pronouncement in Myers is the fact that appellate courts have the
constitutional and statutory power to consider appeals, and yet are
held to lack subject matter jurisdiction over appeals that are
untimely. See Utah Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as
provided by statute . . . . " ) ; id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all
other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2) (specifying
appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[F]ailure to file
an appeal within the required time limit deprived the court of
subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 2d
36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)).
The very best indication that the Myers court simply did not have
before it the issue we must decide--at least not in any kind of
cogent, well-developed w a y — i s that the only authority cited in Myers
is two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals and the statute
giving the district courts original jurisdiction of "all matters
civil and criminal," subject to certain limitations. Myers, 2003 UT
31 at 516 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002)). The Myers
opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it treat, the extensive
state and federal jurisprudence categorizing the facial
unconstitutionality of a criminal statute as being a matter^of_
subject matter jurisdiction—a virtual impossibility if the argument
had actually been made and was well-supported, as in the instant
case.
8. Given the clarity of the Utah Law, decisions from the federal
courts are not helpful. Nor are the federal cases even consistent
with each other. See, e.g., United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549,
552 (9th Cir. 1989) amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The
dividing line between the majority of constitutional claims waived by
a voluntary plea of guilty, and those that challenge the right of the
state to hale the defendant into court, and thus survive the plea . .
. , has not been crystal-clear.").
9. In an attempt to bolster the main opinion's reasoning, the
concurring opinion discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals.
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with murder in
juvenile court. Thankfully, this potential calamity has already been
resolved by our legislature. See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105(1)
(a) (2002) (detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts). By contrast,
our legislature has not limited the jurisdiction of district courts
in a similar manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The
district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by
law."). Second, the criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the

nonexistent crime of blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy
existed, then we would not indulge in the presumption that a
nonexistent, unwritten statute was constitutional. Here, however, a
statute does exist, and, until challenged, we must presume it to be
constitutional. Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the
theoretical crime of blasphemy, and did not preserve his
constitutional challenge, then he could raise the challenge for the
first time on appeal by arguing plain error. A plain error challenge
could easily be made without making the facial constitutionality of a
statute a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.
As for the concurring opinion's statement that ff[n]o Utah appellate
court has squarely answered the question of whether a challenge based
on facial unconstitutionality goes to subject matter jurisdiction,"
our supreme court has squarely addressed the question. In Myers v.
State, 2004 UT 31, 498 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, the Utah Supreme Court
explained that even when Myers argued, for the first time on appeal,
that the wholly and facially unconstitutional aggravated murder
statute divested the trial court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to
state any legitimate jurisdictional defect" because "[t]he Utah Code
provides that fthe district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.1" Id_^ at 1116 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus, even when Norris
argues, for the first time on appeal, that the communications fraud
statute is facially unconstitutional, and that such
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court, he fails "to state any legitimate jurisdictional
defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at 116.

